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Abstract11
Differential privacy is a widely studied notion of privacy for various models of computation,12
based on measuring differences between probability distributions. We consider (, δ)-differential13
privacy in the setting of labelled Markov chains. For a given , the parameter δ can be captured by14
a variant of the total variation distance, which we call lvα (where α = e).15
First we study lvα directly, showing that it cannot be computed exactly. However, the associated16
approximation problem turns out to be in PSPACE and #P-hard. Next we introduce a new17
bisimilarity distance for bounding lvα from above, which provides a tighter bound than previously18
known distances while remaining computable with the same complexity (polynomial time with19
an NP oracle). We also propose an alternative bound that can be computed in polynomial time.20
Finally, we illustrate the distances on case studies.21
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1 Introduction29
Differential privacy [14] is a security property that ensures that a small perturbation of the30
input leads to only a small perturbation in the output, so that observing the output makes it31
difficult to discern whether a particular piece of information was present in the input. It has32
been shown that various bisimilarity distances can bound the differential privacy of a labelled33
Markov chain, by bounding for example the  [6, 31] and δ [9] privacy parameters. Bisimilarity34
distances [17, 11] were introduced as a metric analogue of probabilistic bisimulation [23], to35
overcome the problem that bisimilarity is too sensitive to minor changes in probabilities.36
We further the study of bounds to δ by defining new bisimilarity distances. The bisimilarity37
distance of [9], inspired by the work of [31], transpired to be computable in polynomial time38
with an NP oracle. The work of [31] defined distances using the Kantorovich metric and the39
associated bisimilarity distance based on a fixed point; and considered the effect of replacing40
the absolute value function with another metric. For the purposes of (, δ)-differential privacy41
the distance required is not a metric, nor even a pseudometric, so their methods are adapted42
in [9] to account for this; resulting in a distance function bdα which can be used to bound43
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Figure 1 Partial order of distances, such that a → b ⇐⇒ a ≤ b. FP is the functional
counterpart of P, where the value of the function can be computed in polynomial time. FPNP
indicates polynomial time with NP oracle. tvα and bdα are introduced in [9] and recalled in
Sections 3 and 6, respectively. The remaining distances are the contribution of this paper.
the δ parameter in differential privacy from above. The function, however, retained the44
symmetry property that bdα(s, s′) = bdα(s′, s). In this paper we further study distances45
to bound differential privacy in labelled Markov chains, but drop this symmetry property46
and discover a tighter bound, which can be computed with the same cost. We also define a47
weaker bisimilarity distance for bounding δ that can be computed in polynomial time.48
The privacy parameter in question, δ, can be expressed as a variant of the total variation49
distance tvα. In particular we define lvα as a single component of tvα (which is a maximum50
over two functions). This distance is a way of measuring the maximum difference of51
probabilities between any two states. Total variation distance is usually expressed using52
absolute difference, but for differential privacy a skew is introduced into this distance. These53
exact distances transpire to be very difficult to compute: we confirm that the threshold54
distance problem, which asks whether the distance is below a given threshold, is undecidable55
and approximating it is #P-hard. We also show that for finite words it can be approximated56
in PSPACE. These results match the results of [22] for standard total variation distances.57
We then bound the distance lvα from above by a distance ldα which will turn out to58
be computable, in a similar manner to how bdα bounds tvα in [9]. We show that ldα can59
be computed in polynomial time with an NP oracle (that is, with the same complexity as60
bdα). We further generalise ldα to a new distance lgdα, computable in polynomial time.61
This new distance, is no smaller than ldα, and we conjecture it might be equal. We can62
then take max{ldα(s, s′), ldα(s′, s)} and max{lgdα(s, s′), lgdα(s′, s)} as sound upper bounds63
on δ. Thus we have defined the first non-trivial estimate of the δ parameter that can be64
computed in polynomial time (trivially, always returning 1 is technically correct). Our results65
show that taking the maximum over two ldα is a better approximation than bdα from [9].66
We confirm this using several case studies, where we also demonstrate, on a randomised67
response mechanism, that the estimates based on ldα can beat standard differential privacy68
composition theorems. The relationships between distances are summarised in Figure 1.69
Research into behavioural pseudometrics has a long history going back to Giacalone et70
al [17]. Our work lies in the tradition of bisimulation pseudometrics based on the Kantorovich71
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distance started by Desharnais et al [11, 12], and builds upon subsequent work on computing72
them [29]. Chatzikokolakis et al [6] generalised the pseudometric framework to handle73
-differential privacy, and indeed arbitrary metrics, but did not consider the complexity of74
calculating the distances. We introduced a distance in [9] for (, δ)-differential privacy, which75
is improved upon in this paper. As concerns approximation, we are not aware of any related76
work on distances other than the total variation distance [8, 22].77
2 Preliminaries78
Given a finite set X, let Dist(X) be the set of all stochastic vectors in RX . If X is a set of79
symbols then X∗ is the set of all sequences of symbols in X, X+ all sequences of length at80
least one, and Xω all infinite sequences.81
I Definition 1 (labelled Markov chains (LMC’s)). A labelled Markov chain M is a tuple82
〈S,Σ, µ, `〉, where S is a finite set of states, Σ is a finite alphabet, µ : S → Dist(S) is the83
transition function and ` : S → Σ is the labelling function.84
We assume that all transition probabilities are rational, represented as a pair of binary85
integers. size(M) is the number of bits required to represent 〈S,Σ, µ, `〉, including the bit86
size of the probabilities. We will write µs for µ(s).87
In what follows, we study probabilities associated with infinite sequences of labels88
generated by LMC’s. We specify the relevant probability spaces next using standard measure89
theory [5, 2]. Let us start with the definition of cylinder sets.90
I Definition 2. A subset C ⊆ Σω is a cylinder set if there exists u ∈ Σ∗ such that C consists91
of all infinite sequences from Σω whose prefix is u. We then write Cu to refer to C.92
Cylinder sets play a prominent role in measure theory in that their finite unions can be93
used as a generating family (an algebra) for the set FΣ of measurable subsets of Σω (the94
cylindrical σ-algebra). Where clear from context we will omit Σ in the subscript of F . What95
will be important for us is that any measure ν on (Σω,FΣ) is uniquely determined by its96
values on cylinder sets [5, Chapter 1, Section 2][2, Section 10.1]. Next we show how to assign97
a measure νs on (Σω,FΣ) to an arbitrary state of an LMCM.98
I Definition 3. Given M = 〈S,Σ, µ, `〉, let µ+ : S+ → [0, 1] and `+ : S+ → Σ+ be the99
natural extensions of the functions µ and ` to S+, i.e. µ+(s0 · · · sk) =
∏k−1
i=0 µsi(si+1) and100
`+(s0 · · · sk) = `(s0) · · · `(sk), where k ≥ 0 and si ∈ S (0 ≤ i ≤ k). Note that, for any101
s ∈ S, we have µ+(s) = 1. Given s ∈ S, let Pathss(M) be the subset of S+ consisting of all102
sequences that start with s.103
I Definition 4. LetM = 〈S,Σ, µ, `〉 and s ∈ S. We define νs : FΣ → [0, 1] to be the unique104
measure on (Σω,FΣ) such that for any cylinder Cu we have νs(Cu) =
∑
µ+(p) where the105
summation is over p ∈ Pathss(M) such that `+(p) = u.106
I Example 5 (transition-labelled LMC’s). Like in [29, 7, 1, 27, 9], Definition 1 features107
labelled states. However, Markov chains with labelled transitions can also be described in108
the framework of that definition.109
In particular, suppose we are given a chainM of the form 〈S,Σ, T 〉, where S is a finite set110
of states, Σ is a finite alphabet and T : S → Dist(S ×Σ) is the transition function. We write111
each transition as q p−→
a
q′, meaning that T (q)(q′, a) = p. From this transition-labelled LMC,112
we create an equivalent state-labelled Markov chainM′: for each state and each label, add113
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new state (q, a) labelled with a, such that, when q p−→
b
q′, we have µ(q,a)((q′, b)) = p for every114
a ∈ Σ. Technically, this delays reading of the first character until the second state visited.115
To account for this, introduce an additional character, say `, so that νs(Cw) = ν′(s,`)(C`w),116
where ν and ν′ refer to the measures associated withM andM′ respectively (Definition 4).117
I Example 6 (finite-word LMC’s). We can also describe labelled Markov chains over finite118
words. These chains have a set of final states F , which have no outgoing transitions. We119
require positive probability of reaching a final state from every reachable state. We define the120
function νs(w) =
∑
µ+(p), where the summation is over p ∈ Pathss(M) such that `+(p) = w121
and p|w| ∈ F , so that we only consider paths which end in a final state. The function can be122
extended to sets of words E ⊆ Σ∗ (which are countable) by νs(E) =
∑
w∈E νs(w).123
Such machines can also be represented by infinite-word Markov chains. One can simulate124
the end of the word by an additional character, say $ such that, for q ∈ F , µq(q) = 1 and125
`(q) = $, so that the only trace that can be observed from q is $ω. Then, for a word w ∈ Σ∗,126
we rather study w$$$ . . . , corresponding to the cylinder Cw$. In the translated infinite-word127
model, the event Cu corresponds to the event {w ∈ Σ∗ | prefix(w) = u} in the original128
finite-word model. Some of our arguments will be carried out in the finite-word setting, as129
hardness results that apply to these chains also apply to infinite-word Markov chains. Other130
arguments will only be possible in the finite-word setting.131
Let us return to the general definition of Markov chains (Definition 1). Our aim will132
be to compare states from the point of view of differential privacy. Any two states s, s′133
can be viewed as indistinguishable if νs(E) = νs′(E) for every E ∈ F . More generally,134
the difference between them can be quantified using the total variation distance, defined135
by tv(ν, ν′) = supE∈F |ν(E) − ν′(E)|. GivenM = 〈S,Σ, µ, `〉 and s, s′ ∈ S, we shall write136
tv(s, s′) to refer to tv(νs, νs′). Ensuring such pairs of measures (νs, νs′) are ‘similar’ is137
essential for privacy, so that it is difficult to observe which of the states was the originating138
position. To measure probabilities relevant to differential privacy, we will need to study a139
more general variant lvα of the above distance, which we introduce shortly.140
3 (, δ)-Differential Privacy141
Differential privacy is a mathematically rigorous definition of privacy due to Dwork et al [14];142
the aim is to ensure that inputs which are related in some sense lead to very similar outputs.143
Formally it requires that for two related states there only ever be a small change in output144
probabilities, and therefore discerning which of the two states was actually used is difficult,145
maintaining their privacy. We rely on the definition of approximate differential privacy in146
the context of labelled Markov chains, as per [9].147
I Definition 7. Let M = 〈S,Σ, µ, `〉 be a labelled Markov chain and let R ⊆ S × S be a148
symmetric relation. Given  ≥ 0 and δ ∈ [0, 1], we say thatM is (, δ)-differentially private149
w.r.t. R if, for every s, s′ ∈ S such that (s, s′) ∈ R, we have νs(E) ≤ e · νs′(E) + δ for every150
measurable set E ∈ F .151
What it means for two states to be related, as specified by R, is to a large extent domain-152
specific. In general, R makes it possible to spell out which states should not appear too153
different and, consequently, should enjoy a quantitative amount of privacy.154
Note that each state s ∈ S can be viewed as defining a random variable Xs with155
outcomes from Σω such that P[Xs ∈ E] = νs(E). Then the above can be rewritten as156
P[Xs ∈ E] ≤ e P[Xs′ ∈ E] + δ, which matches the definition from [14], where one would157
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consider Xs, Xs′ neighbouring in some natural sense. In the typical database scenario, one158
would relate database states that differ by exactly one entry. In our setting, we refer to159
states of a machine, for which we would like it to be indiscernible as to which was the start160
state, assuming that the states are hidden and the traces are observable.161
When δ = 0, we use the term -differential privacy, which amounts to measuring the162
ratio between the probabilities of possible outcomes. When one cannot expect to achieve this163
pure -differential privacy, the relaxed approximate differential privacy is used [24]. When164
 = 0, δ is captured exactly by the statistical distance (total variation distance) tv .165
Our aim is to capture the value of δ required to satisfy the differential privacy property166
for a given . That is, given a LMC M, a symmetric relation R and α = e ≥ 1, we167
want to determine the smallest δ such that M is (, δ)-differentially private with respect168
to R. We can measure the difference between two measures ν, ν′ on (Σω,F) as follows:169
tvα(ν, ν′) = supE∈F ∆α(ν(E), ν′(E)) where ∆α(a, b) = max{a − αb, b − αa, 0} [3]. When170
used on νs, νs′ and α = e, tvα(s, s′) gives the required δ between states s, s′ [9].171
In this paper we observe that significant simplification occurs by splitting the two main172
parts of the maximum, taking only the ‘left variant’. Whilst ∆α is symmetric, we break173
this property to introduce a new distance function Λα (similarly to [4]). Then we define an174
analogous total variation distance lvα, which will be our main object of study.175
I Definition 8 (Asymmetric skewed total variation distance). Let α ≥ 1. Given two measures176
ν, ν′ on (Σω,F), let lvα(ν, ν′) = supE∈F Λα(ν(E), ν′(E)), where Λα(a, b) = max{a− αb, 0}.177
We will write lvα(s, s′) for lvα(νs, νs′). Note that it is not required to take the maximum178
with zero, that is lvα(ν, ν′) = supE∈F ν(E) − αν′(E), since there is always an event such179
that ν′(E) = 0, in particular ν(∅) = 0. Observe that ∆α and Λα are not metrics as180
∆α(a, b) = 0 6=⇒ a = b, and in fact not even pseudometrics as the triangle inequality does181
not hold. Our new distance Λα (and lvα) is not symmetric, while ∆α and tvα are.182
If α = 1, then lv1 = tv1 = tv, since if ν, ν′ are probability measures and we have183
ν(E) = 1−ν(E) then supE∈F |ν(E)−ν′(E)| = supE∈F ν(E)−ν′(E) = supE∈F ν′(E)−ν(E),184
i.e., despite the use of the absolute value in the definition of tv, it is not required.185
We can reformulate differential privacy in terms of tvα and lvα.186
I Proposition 9. Given a labelled Markov chainM and a symmetric relation R ⊆ S × S,187
the following properties are equivalent for α = e:188
M is (, δ)-differentially private w.r.t. R,189
max(s,s′)∈R tvα(s, s′) ≤ δ, and190
max(s,s′)∈R lvα(s, s′) ≤ δ.191
We now focus on computing lvα, since this will allow us to determine the ‘level’ of192
differential privacy for a given . Henceforth we will refer to e as α. For the purposes of our193
complexity arguments, we will only use rational α with O(size(M))-bit representation.194
4 lvα is not computable195
tv(s, s′) turns out to be surprisingly difficult to compute: the threshold distance problem196
(whether the distance is strictly greater than a given threshold) is undecidable, and the197
non-strict variant of the problem (“greater or equal”) is not known to be decidable [22]. The198
undecidability result is shown by reduction from the emptiness problem for probabilistic199
automata to the threshold distance problem for finite-word transition-labelled Markov chains.200
Recall that such chains are a special case of our more general definition of infinite-word201
state-labelled Markov chains. Thus, the problem is undecidable in this case also.202
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Figure 2 Markov chainM′ in the reduction from tv(q, q′) to lvα(s, s′)
Since tv = lv1, we know that lv1(s, s′) > θ is undecidable. We show that this is not203
special, that is, the problem remains undecidable for any fixed α > 1. In other words, no204
value of the privacy parameter  makes it possible to compute the optimal δ exactly.205
I Theorem 10. Finding a value of tv reduces in polynomial time to finding a value of lvα.206
Proof. Given a labelled Markov chain M = 〈Q,Σ, µ, `〉, and states q, q′ for which we207
require the answer tv(q, q′), we construct a new labelled Markov chain M′, for which208
lvα(s, s′) = tv(q, q′).209
We defineM′ = 〈Q∪{s, s′,⊥},Σ′, µ′, `′〉, with `′(s) = `′(s′) = B, `′(⊥) = C, `′(x) = `(x)210
for all x ∈ Q, Σ′ = Σ ∪ {B,C},211
µ′s(q) = 1, µ′s′(q′) =
1
α
, µ′s′(⊥) =
α− 1
α
, and µ′x(y) = µx(y) for all x, y ∈ Q.212
The reduction, sketched in Figure 2, adds three new states, so can be done in polynomial213
time. We claim lvα(s, s′) = tv(q, q′).214
Consider E ∈ FΣ, observe that νq(E) = νs(E′) and νq′(E) = ανs′(E′), where E′ =215
{Bw | w ∈ E} ∈ FΣ′ . Then νq(E)− νq′(E) = νs(E′)− ανs′(E′) and lvα(s, s′) ≥ tv(q, q′).216
Conversely, consider an event E′ ∈ FΣ′ . Since the character C can only be reached from217
s′, any word using it contributes negatively to the difference. Hence intersecting the event218
with BΣω, to remove C, can only increase the difference. The character B must occur (only)219
as the first character of every (useful) word in E′. Let E = {w | Bw ∈ E′ ∩ BΣω} ∈ FΣ,220
then νq(E)− νq′(E) ≥ νs(E′)− ανs′(E′). Thus tv(q, q′) ≥ lvα(s, s′). J221
Since an oracle to solve decision problems for lvα would solve problems for tv , we obtain222
the following result.223
I Corollary 11. lvα(s, s′) > θ is undecidable for α ≥ 1.224
It is not clear that lvα reduces easily to tv . Arguments along the lines of the proof of Theo-225
rem 10 may not result in a Markov chain due to non-stochastic transitions, or modifications226
to the s→ q branch may result in new maximising events.227
5 Approximation of lvα228
Given that lvα cannot be computed exactly, we turn to approximation: the problem, given229
γ > 0, of finding some x such that |x − lvα(s, s′)| ≤ γ. For α = 1, it is known that230
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approximating tv = lv1 is possible in PSPACE but #P-hard [8, 22]. We show that the231
case α = 1 is not special; that is, when α > 1, lvα can also be approximated and the same232
complexity bounds apply.233
I Remark. Typically one might suggest being  close (|x− lvα(s, s′)| ≤ ). To avoid confusion234
with the differential privacy parameter, we refer to γ close.235
I Theorem 12. For finite-word Markov chains, approximation of lvα(s, s′) within γ can be236
performed in PSPACE and is #P-hard.237
Proof (sketch). For the upper bound, we show that the ith bit of an x such that |x −238
lvα(s, s′)| ≤ γ can be found in PSPACE. The approach, inspired by [22], is to consider239
the maximising event of lvα(s, s′) = supE⊆Σ∗ νs(E) − ανs′(E), which turns out to be240
W = {w | νs(w) ≥ ανs′(w)}, so that lvα(s, s′) = νs(W ) − ανs′(W ). This choice of the241
maximising event only applies to finite-word Markov chains, thus the proof does not extend242
in full generality to infinite-word Markov chains. The shape of the event is the key difference243
between our proof and [22], which uses events of the form {w | νs(w) ≥ νs′(w)}.244
Let W denote the complement of W and let νs(W ) be approximated by a number X and245
νs′(W ) by a number Y . Normally, one would expect X to be close to νs(W ) and Y to be246
close to νs′(W ). Here, the trick is to require only that νs(W ) +ανs′(W ) be close to X +αY .247
It is then argued that, for specific X,Y with this property, one can find any bit of X + αY .248
For the lower bound, we note that approximating tv is #P-hard [22], by a reduction from249
#NFA, a #P-complete problem [20]. That is, given a non-deterministic finite automaton A250
and n ∈ N in unary, determine |Σn ∩ L(A)|, the number of accepted words of A of length n.251
Since tv can be reduced to lvα (Theorem 10), approximating lvα is #P-hard as well. The252
hardness result applies to finite-word transition-labelled Markov chains, thus also to the253
more general infinite-word labelled Markov chains. J254
6 A least fixed point bound ldα255
We seek to bound lvα from above by a computable quantity, and will introduce a distance256
function ldα for this. We first introduce a variant of the Kantorovich lifting as a technique to257
measure the distance between probability distributions on a set X, given a distance function258
between objects of X. We show that lvα can be reformulated using such a distance over the259
(infinite) trace distributions νs, νs′ . We then define an alternative distance function between260
states, ldα, as the fixed point of the Kantorovich lifting of distances from individual states261
to (finite) state distributions. We will observe that it is possible to compute and acts as a262
sound bound on lvα.263
We use this distance to determine (, δ)-differential private w.r.t. relation R by bounding264
δ with max(s,s′)∈R ldα(s, s′). We will show this can be achieved in polynomial time with265
access to an NP oracle, by computing ldα(s, s′) exactly in this time (|R| is polynomial with266
respect to the size ofM). This suggests a complexity lower than approximation (which is267
#P-hard by Theorem 12).268
I Definition 13 (Asymmetric Skewed Kantorovich Lifting). For a set X, given d : X ×X →269
[0, 1] a distance function and measures µ, µ′, we define270
KΛα (d)(µ, µ′) = sup
f :X→[0,1]
∀x,x′∈X Λα(f(x),f(x′))≤d(x,x′)
Λα(
∫
X
fdµ,
∫
X
fdµ′)271
where f ranges over functions which are measurable w.r.t. µ and µ′.272
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I Remark. The (standard) Kantorovich distance lifts a distance function d over the ground273
objects X to a distance between measures µ, µ′ on the set X. This is equivalent to replacing274
Λα with the absolute distance function (abs(a, b) = |a−b|). We note that KΛα (d) is equivalent275
to the standard Kantorovich distance for α = 1 and d symmetric [21, 10]. If |X| < ∞276
(for example when X is a finite set of states, S), we have
∫
X
fdµ =
∑
x∈X f(x)µ(x).277
Chatzikokolakis et al [6] considered the case where the absolute value function was replaced278
by any metric d′. Our lifting KΛα does not quite fit in this framework, since Λα is not metric.279
The interest in KΛα is that it allows us to reformulate the definition of the distance function280
lvα. Our goal is to measure the difference between measures over infinite traces νs, νs′ , and281
so we lift a distance function over infinite words (d : Σω × Σω → [0, 1]). In particular, we lift282
the discrete metric 16= (the indicator function over inequality with 16=(w,w′) = 1 for w 6= w′,283
and 0 otherwise).284
I Lemma 14. lvα(s, s′) = KΛα (16=)(νs, νs′).285
Since computing lvα, or now KΛα (16=)(νs, νs′), is difficult, we introduce an upper bound286
on lvα, inspired by bisimilarity distances, which we will call ldα. This will be the least287
fixed point of ΓΛα, a function which measures (relative to a distance function d) the distance288
between the transition distributions of s, s′ where s, s′ share a label, or 1 when they do not.289
I Definition 15. Let ΓΛα : [0, 1]S×S → [0, 1]S×S be defined as follows.290
ΓΛα(d)(s, s′) =
{
KΛα (d)(µs, µs′) `(s) = `(s′)
1 otherwise
291
The utility of this function is that we are not now using the Kantorovich lifting over infinite292
trace distributions, but rather over finite transition distributions (µs ∈ Dist(S)).293
Note that [0, 1]S×S equipped with the pointwise order, written v, is a complete lattice294
and that Γα is monotone with respect to that order (larger d permit more functions, thus295
larger supremum). Consequently, ΓΛα has a least fixed point [28]. We take our distance to be296
exactly that point.297
I Definition 16. Let ldα : S × S → [0, 1] be the least fixed point of ΓΛα.298
To provide a guarantee of privacy we require a sound upper bound on lvα.299
I Theorem 17. lvα(s, s′) ≤ ldα(s, s′) for every s, s′ ∈ S.300
The proof of Theorem 17 proceeds similarly to Lemma 2 in [9]. We will see, however, that301
this upper bound on lvα is stronger (or at least no worse) than the bound obtained in [9].302
Recall from [9] that bdα is defined as the least fixed point of303
Γ∆α (d)(s, s′) =
{
K∆α (d)(µs, µs′) `(s) = `(s′)
1 otherwise
304
where K∆α (d) behaves as KΛα (d), but uses ∆α(a, b) = max{a − αb, b − αa, 0} rather than305
Λα(a, b) = max{a− αb, 0}.306
I Theorem 18. max{ldα(s, s′), ldα(s′, s)} ≤ bdα(s, s′) for every s, s′ ∈ S.307
Proof. Given a matrix A, let AT be its transpose. Consider bdα and ldα as matrices. bdα is308
the least fixed point of Γ∆α so Γ∆α (bdα)(s, s′) = bdα(s, s′). Also notice that ΓΛα(bdα)(s, s′) ≤309
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LD-threshold(s, s′, θ) = ∃(di,j)i,j∈S
∧
i,j∈S
(0 ≤ di.j ≤ 1) ∧ ds,s′ ≤ θ
∧
∧
q,q′∈S
{
dq,q′ = 1 `(q) 6= `(q′)
couplingConstraint(d, q, q′) `(q) = `(q′)
couplingConstraint(d, q, q′) = ∃(ωi,j)i,j∈S ∃(γi)i∈S ∃(τi)i∈S ∃(ηi)i∈S
∑
i,j∈S
ωi,j · di,j +
∑
i
ηi ≤ dq,q′ ∧
∧
i,j∈S
(0 ≤ ωi,j ≤ 1) ∧
∧
i∈S

0 ≤ γi ≤ 1
0 ≤ τi ≤ 1
0 ≤ ηi ≤ 1
∧
∧
i∈S
(
∑
j∈S
ωi,j − γi + τi + ηi = µq(i)) ∧
∧
j∈S
(
∑
i∈S
ωi,j +
τj − γj
α
≤ µq′(j))
Figure 3 NP Formula for LD-threshold
Γ∆α (bdα)(s, s′), since KΛα (bdα) v K∆α (bdα). To see this, note that, because bdα = bdTα, the310
relevant set of functions is the same, but the objective function in the supremum is smaller.311
Hence ΓΛα(bdα) v bdα, i.e. bdα is also a pre-fixed point of ΓΛα. Since ldα is the least pre-312
fixed point of ΓΛα then we know ldα v bdα. By symmetry, bdα = bdTα giving ldα v bdTα and313
then ldTα v bdα. We conclude max{ldα(s, s′), ldα(s′, s)} ≤ bdα(s, s′) for every s, s′ ∈ S. J314
I Remark. Example 32 on page 13 demonstrates the inequality in Theorem 18 can be strict.315
The standard variant of the Kantorovich metric is often presented in its dual formulation.316
In the case of finite distributions, the asymmetric skewed Kantorovich distance exhibits a317
dual form. This is obtained through the standard recipe for dualising linear programming.318
Interestingly, this technique yields a linear optimisation problem over a polytope independent319
of d, and that will prove useful in the computation of ldα.320
I Lemma 19. Let X be finite and given d : X×X → [0, 1] a distance function, µ, µ′ ∈ Dist(X)321
we have322
KΛα (d)(µ, µ′) = min(ω,η)∈Ωα
µ,µ′
( ∑
s,s′∈X
ωs,s′ · d(s, s′) +
∑
s∈X
ηs
)
, where323
324
Ωαµ,µ′ =
(ω, η) ∈ [0, 1]X×X × [0, 1]X |
∃γ, τ ∈ [0, 1]X
∀i : ∑j ωi,j + τi − γi + ηi = µ(i)
∀j : ∑i ωi,j + τj−γjα ≤ µ′(j)
 .325
When we refer to distance between states (X = S) we write Ωαs,s′ to mean Ωαµs,µs′ . We take326
V (Ωαs,s′) to be the vertices of the polytope.327
I Theorem 20. ldα can be computed in polynomial time with access to an NP oracle.328
We first show that the LD-threshold problem, which asks if ldα(s, s′) ≤ θ, is in NP. This329
is achieved through the formula shown in Figure 3, based on Lemma 19 and [30] which used330
a similar formula to approximate bisimilarity distances. The problem can be solved in NP331
as each of the variables can be shown to be satisfied in the optimal solution with rational332
numbers that are of polynomial size (see [9, Theorems 1 and 2]). It suffices to guess these333
numbers (non-deterministically) and verify the correctness of the formula in polynomial time.334
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Since the threshold problem can be solved in NP, we can approximate the value using335
binary search with polynomial overhead to arbitrary accuracy γ, thus we find a value x such336
that |x− ldα(s, s′)| ≤ γ. In fact, one can find the exact value of ldα(s, s′) in polynomial time337
assuming the oracle. We can show the value of ldα is rational and its size is polynomially338
bounded, one can find it by approximation to a carefully chosen level of precision and then339
finding the relevant rational with the continued fraction algorithm [18, Section 5.1][16].340
7 A greatest fixed point bound lgdα341
In the previous section we have used the least fixed point of ΓΛα, which finds the fixed point342
closest to our objective lvα. We now consider relaxing this requirement so that we can find a343
fixed point in polynomial time. We will introduce lgdα, expressing the greatest fixed point344
and represent it as a linear program that can be solved in polynomial time. Relaxing to any345
fixed point could of course be much worse than ldα, so we first refine our fixed point function346
(ΓΛα) to reduce the potential gap. We do this by characterising the elements which are zero347
in ldα and fixing these as such; so that they cannot be larger in the greatest fixed point.348
Refinement of ΓΛα349
In the case of standard bisimulation distances the kernel of ld1, that is {(s, s′) | ld1(s, s′) = 0},350
is exactly bisimilarity. We consider the kernel for ldα and define a new relation ∼α, which351
we call skewed bisimilarity, which captures zero distance.352
I Definition 21. Let a relation R ⊆ S × S have the property353
(s, s′) ∈ R ⇐⇒ ∃ (ω, η) ∈ Ωαs,s′ s.t. (ωu,v > 0 =⇒ (u, v) ∈ R) ∧ ∀u ηu = 0.354
Arbitrary unions of such relations also maintain the property, thus a largest such relation355
exists. Let ∼α be the largest relation with this property.356
I Remark. When α = 1 the formulation corresponds to an alternative characterisation of357
bisimilarity [19, 27], so ∼1 = ∼.358
I Lemma 22. ldα(s, s′) = 0 if and only if s ∼α s′.359
Since ldα(s, s′) = 0 implies lvα(s, s′) = 0, this also provides a way to show that δ is zero,360
that is, to show -differential privacy holds. However, note this is not a complete method to361
do this, and there are bisimilarity distances focused on finding  [6].362
I Lemma 23. If s ∼α s′ then lvα(s, s′) = 0.363
We need to be able to quickly and independently compute which pairs of states are364
related by ∼α. In fact we can do this in polynomial time using a closure procedure, which365
will terminate after polynomially many rounds.366
I Proposition 24. ∼α can be computed in polynomial time in size(M).367
Proof. We present a standard refinement algorithm, let A0 = S × S and compute Ai+1 =368
{(s, s′) ∈ Ai | ∃(ω, η) ∈ Ωαs,s′ : η = 0 ∧ (ωu,v > 0 =⇒ (u, v) ∈ Ai)}. To find this, define369
1!Ai , a matrix such that 1!Ai(s, s′) = 0 if (s, s′) ∈ Ai and 1 otherwise. Apply ΓΛα to 1!Ai ,370
which amounts to computing n2 linear programs. Take Ai+1 to be indices of the matrix371
where ΓΛα(1!Ai) is zero. At each step, we remove at least one element, or stabilise so that the372
set will not change in subsequent rounds. After n2 steps it is either stable or empty.373
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An2 ⊆∼α: after convergence we have some set such that (s, s′) ∈ An2 =⇒ ∃(ω, η) ∈374
Ωαs,s′ : η = 0 ∧ (ωu,v > 0 =⇒ (u, v) ∈ An2). ∼α is the largest such set, so it contains An2 .375
∼α⊆ An2 : by induction we start with ∼α⊆ A0 and only remove pairs not in ∼α. J376
Recall that ldα was defined as the least fixed point of ΓΛα. Let us refine ΓΛα so the gap377
between the least fixed point and the greatest is as small as possible. We do this by fixing378
the known values of the least fixed point in the function, in particular the zero cases. We let379
Γ′Λα (d)(s, s′) =
{
0 s ∼α s′
ΓΛα(d)(s, s′) otherwise
380
and observe that ldα is also the least fixed point of Γ′Λα .381
I Lemma 25. ldα is the least fixed point of Γ′Λα .382
Definition and Computation of lgdα383
Towards a more efficiently computable function, we now study the greatest fixed point.384
I Definition 26. We let lgdα to be the greatest fixed point of Γ′Λα .385
It is equivalent to consider the greatest post-fixed point. It turns out that when α = 1,386
lgd1 = ld1 [7]. We do not know if this holds for α > 1, although conjecture that it might.387
Whilst it may not necessarily be as tight a bound on lvα as ldα, we can also use lgdα to388
bound lvα, thus the δ parameter of (, δ)-differential privacy. Because ldα(s, s′) ≤ lgdα(s, s′)389
for every s, s′ ∈ S, then Theorem 17 implies that lvα(s, s′) ≤ lgdα(s, s′), for every s, s′ ∈ S.390
We will show that lgdα can be computed in polynomial time using the ellipsoid method391
for solving a linear program of exponential size, matching the result of [7] for standard392
bisimilarity distances. Whilst we will not need to express the entire linear program in one go,393
we may need any one constraint at a time, so we need to be able to express each constraint,394
in polynomially many bits. We show that the representation of vertices of Ωαs,s′ is small.395
I Lemma 27. Each (ω, η) ∈ V (Ωαs,s′) are rational numbers requiring a number of bits396
polynomial in size(M).397
Proof. Consider the polytope:398
Ω′αµ,µ′ =
{
(ω, τ, γ, η) ∈ [0, 1]S×S × ([0, 1]S)3 | ∀i :
∑
j ωi,j + τi − γi + ηi = µ(i)
∀j : ∑i ωi,j + τj−γjα ≤ µ′(j)
}
399
Each vertex is the intersection of hyperplanes defined in terms of µ, µ′ (rationals given in400
the inputM), thus vertices of Ω′αµ,µ′ are rationals with representation size polynomial in the401
input. Vertices of Ωαµ,µ′ = {(ω, η) | ∃τ, γ (ω, τ, γ, η) ∈ Ω′αµ,µ′} require only fewer bits. J402
The following linear program (LP) expresses the greatest post-fixed point. It has polyno-403
mially many variables but exponentially many constraints (for each s, s′ one constraint for404
each ω ∈ V (Ωαs,s′)). Since linear programs can be solved in polynomial time, the greatest405
fixed point can be found in exponential time using the exponential size linear program.406
I Proposition 28. lgdα is the optimal solution, d ∈ [0, 1]S×S of the following linear program:407
maxd∈[0,1]S×S
∑
(u,v)∈S×S du,v subject to: for all s, s′ ∈ S:408
ds,s′ = 0 whenever s ∼α s′,
ds,s′ = 1 whenever `(s) 6= `(s′),
ds,s′ ≤
∑
(u,v)∈S×S
ωu,vdu,v +
∑
u∈S
ηu for all (ω, η) ∈ V (Ωαs,s′) otherwise.
409
CONCUR 2019
10:12 Asymmetric Distances for Approximate Differential Privacy
Proof. The s ∼α s′ and `(s) 6= `(s′) cases follow by definition. Observe that by the definition410
of lgdα as a post-fixed point it is required that d(s, s′) ≤ Γ′Λα (d)(s, s′) = KΛα (d)(s, s′) =411
min(ω,η)∈Ωα
s,s′
∑
(u,v)∈S×S ωu,vdu,v +
∑
u∈S ηu or equivalently, for all (ω, η) ∈ Ωαs,s′ : d(s, s′) ≤412 ∑
(u,v)∈S×S ωu,vdu,v +
∑
u∈S ηu J413
In the spirit of [7], we can solve the exponential-size linear program given in Proposition 28414
using the ellipsoid method, in polynomial time. Whilst the linear program has exponentially415
many constraints, it has only polynomially many variables. Therefore, the ellipsoid method416
can be used to solve the linear program in polynomial time, provided a polynomial-time417
separation oracle can be given [26, Chapter 14]. Separation oracle takes as argument418
d ∈ [0, 1]S×S , a proposed solution to the linear program and must decide whether d satisfies419
the constraints or not. If not then it must provide θ ∈ Q|S×S| as a separating hyperplane420
such that, for every d′ that does satisfy the constraints,
∑
u,v du,vθu,v <
∑
u,v d
′
u,vθu,v.421
Our separation oracle will perform the following: for every s, s′ ∈ S check that d(s, s′) ≤422
min(ω,η)∈Ωα
s,s′
ω · d + η · 1. This is done by solving min(ω,η)∈Ωα
s,s′
ω · d + η · 1 using linear423
programming. If every check succeeds, return yes. If some check fails for s, s′ return no and424
θu,v =
{
ωu,v − 1 (u, v) = (s, s′)
ωu,v otherwise
where (ω, η) = argmin
(ω,η)∈V (Ωα
s,s′ )
d · ω + η · 1.425
I Lemma 29. θ is a separating hyperplane, i.e., it separates the unsatisfying d and all426
satisfying d′.427
I Theorem 30. lgdα can be found in polynomial time in the size ofM.428
Proof. Checking d(s, s′) ≤ minω,η∈Ωα
s,s′
ω · d+ η · 1 is polynomial time. The linear program429
is of polynomial size, so runs in polynomial time in the size of the encoding of the linear430
program. Similarly finding θ is polynomial time by running essentially the same linear431
program and reading off the minimising result.432
Because pairs (ω, η) are in V (Ωαs,s′), they are polynomial size in the size ofM, independent433
of d, by Lemma 27. Note that, unlike in Chen et al. [7], the oracle procedure is not strongly434
polynomial, so the time to find θ may depend on the size of d, but the output θ and d remain435
polynomial in the size of the initial system.436
We conclude there is a procedure for computing lgdα running in polynomial time [26,437
Theorem 14.1, Page 173]. There exists a polynomial ψ where the ellipsoid algorithm solves the438
linear program in time T ·ψ(size(M)), where T is the time the separation algorithm takes on439
inputs of size ψ(size(M)). Since the T ∈ poly(ψ(size(M))) and ψ(size(M)) ∈ poly(size(M))440
then T ∈ poly(size(M)). Overall we have T · ψ(size(M)) ∈ poly(size(M)). J441
8 Examples442
I Example 31 (PIN Checker). We demonstrate our methods are a sound technique for443
determining the δ privacy parameter (given e, where  is the other privacy parameter).444
We take as an example, in Figure 4, a PIN checking system from [32, 31]. Intuitively, the445
machine accepts or rejects a code (a or b). Instead of accepting a code deterministically, it446
probabilistically decides whether to accept. The machine allows an attempt with the other447
code if it is not accepted. We model the system that accepts more often on the the pin-code448
a, from state 0, and the system that accepts more often from code b, from state 1. The chain449
simulates attempts to gain access to the system by trying code a then b until the system450
accepts (reaching the ‘end’ state). Pen-and-paper analysis can determine that the system451
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(a) Labelled Markov chain.
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(b) Calculated approximations of δ given .
Figure 4 PIN Checker example: each state denotes its label, transition probabilities on arrows.
is (ln( 28092209 ), 0)-differentially private, or at the other extreme (0,
200
2503 )-differentially private452
( 28092209 ≈ 1.27, 2002503 ≈ 0.0799). The true privacy, lvα is shown along the orange line (N).453
In the blue line (•) we see the estimate bdα as defined in [9]; which correctly bounds454
the true privacy, but is unresponsive to α. Using the methods introduced in this paper we455
compute ldα on the red line () and lgdα on the black line (), which coincide. We observe456
that this is an improvement and is within approximately 1.5 times the true privacy for457
α ≤ 1.035. In this example observe that ldα = lgdα; suggesting lgdα, which can be computed458
in polynomial time is as good as ldα. Our results do eventually suffer, as increasing α cannot459
find a better δ, despite a lower value existing.460
I Example 32 (Randomised Response). The randomised response mechanism allows a data461
subject to reveal a secret answer to a potentially humiliating or sensitive question honestly462
with some degree of plausible deniability. This is achieved by flipping a biased coin and463
providing the wrong answer with some probability based on the coin toss. If there are two464
answers a or b, answering truthfully with probability β1+β and otherwise with
1
1+β leads to465
-differential privacy where e = β and such a bound is tight (there is no smaller ′ such that466
answering in this way gives ′-differential privacy). However, it can be (′, δ)-differentially467
private for ′ <  and some δ.468
Let us consider the single-input, single-output randomised response mechanism shown469
in Figure 5a with β = 2, hence ln(2)-differentially private, alternatively it is (ln( 65 ),
4
15 )-470
differential privacy (ln( 65 ) ≈ ln(2)4 ). We consider the application of composing automata to471
determine more complex properties automatically.472
Differential privacy enjoys multiple composition theorems [15]. When applied to disjoint473
datasets, differential privacy allows the results of (, δ)-differentially private mechanism applied474
to each independently to be combined with no additional loss in privacy. Let us consider the475
two-input, two-output labelled Markov chain (Figure 5b), where we consider each input to476
be from two independent respondents, using our methods verifies that the privacy does not477
increase on the partitioned data. We consider the adjacency relation as the symmetric closure478
of R = {((a, a), (a, b)), ((a, a), (b, a)), ((b, b), (a, b)), ((b, b), (b, a))}. We determine (ln( 65 ), 415 )-479
differential privacy by computing max(s,s′)∈R ld6/5(s, s′) = 415 , verifying there is no privacy480
loss from composition. Because randomised response is finite we can compute lvα for adjacent481
inputs in exponential time for comparison. In this instance, our technique provides the482
optimal solution, in the sense max(s,s′)∈R ld6/5(s, s′) = max(s,s′)∈R lv6/5(s, s′); indicating483
that ldα and lgdα can provide a good approximation.484
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(b) Two-input, two-output
Figure 5 Randomised response. Every second label is the outcome of the randomised response
mechanism and alternately sk (for ‘skip’). The left most state represents the sensitive input.
The basic composition theorems suggest that if a mechanism that is (, δ)-differentially485
private is used k times, one achieves (k, kδ)-differential privacy [13]. However, this is not486
necessarily optimal. More advanced composition theorems may enable tighter analysis,487
although this can can be computationally difficult (#P-complete) [25]. Even this may not488
be exact when allowed to look inside the composed mechanisms. If we assume the responses489
are from two questions answered by the same respondent and let R′ = R ∪ {((a, a), (b, b))},490
naively applying basic composition concludes (ln( 3625 ),
8
15 )-differential privacy. Our methods491
can find a better bound than basic composition since max(s,s′)∈R′ ld36/25(s, s′) = 103225 <
8
15 .492
However, in this case, our technique is not optimal either.493
9 Conclusion494
Our results are summarised in Figure 1 on page 2. We are interested in the value of lvα, but495
it is not computable and difficult to approximate. We have defined an upper bound ldα,496
showing that it is more accurate than the previously known bound bdα from [9] and just497
as easy to compute (in polynomial time with an NP oracle). We also defined a distance498
based on the greatest fixed point, lgdα, which has the same flavour but can be computed499
in polynomial time. When considering lvα directly, we approximate to arbitrary precision500
in PSPACE and show it is #P-hard (which generalises a known result on tv). It is open501
whether the least fixed point bisimilarity distance (or any refinement smaller than lgdα) can502
be computed in polynomial time, or even if lgdα = ldα. It is also open whether approximation503
can be resolved to be in #P, PSPACE-hard, or complete for some intermediate class.504
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